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Abstract of thesis entitled: 
Problems linking the compensation of teachers to the exam results of their students 
have been studied extensively without taking the shadow education system (private 
tutoring) into consideration. This paper shows that linking bonus to performance 
involves a potentially perverse incentive: Teachers may become lazier when faced 
with the choice of inducing their students to go for private tutoring because it 
increases their students' exam results and therefore the teachers' pay. We show that 
better teachers are not less susceptible to such perverse incentives. Such misallocation 
of resources is costly given that private tutoring has been growing in the US after the 
No Child Left Behind Act was introduced. If the growing trend means price is falling, 
then this potential cost is even greater. 
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1 Introduction 
The No Child Left Behind (NCLB) Act makes teachers and schools accountable for the 
performance of their students. At the same time, teacher performance pay is more common 
than before. Eighteen states reward teachers and administrators on the basis of exemplary 
student performance (Jacob, 2005). 
The literature, however, calls for caution. Linking teachers' pay to performance may 
provide perverse incentives like cheating and multitasking problems. This paper discusses 
a new possible perverse incentive: Teachers surprisingly become lazier instead of working 
harder when bonus is introduced, thereby pushing their students out for private tutoring. 
Why do teachers do this? First, it costs less choosing a lower effort level to teach. Second, 
the exam performance of students may be better if they go to tutoring, and so teachers get 
the bonus if there is pay for performance. 
The concern that teachers become lazier when bonus is introduced is important for three 
reasons. First, private tutoring has been growing in the US since the NCLB was advocated. 
Thus there may be a linkage between the two. Second, the types of teachers more susceptible 
to such perverse incentives need to be distinguished; otherwise, the potential loss due to the 
misallocation of economic resources can be huge. Third, this perverse incentive problem can 
worsen in the future. The private tutoring industry in the US has been growing. Current 
estimates show that tutoring has grown into a $5 billion -$8 billion professional service 
industry (Gordon, Morgan, Ponticell and OMalley, 2004). If the growth of private tutoring 
means the tutoring prices are falling, it is even more inevitable that we have such a concern. 
To sum, it is important to take this perverse incentive into account when designing a 
performance pay. 
We build a strategic model to describe the decisions of a teacher and his student, and 
then illustrate the possibilities of injecting a perverse effect to teachers when performance 
pay is introduced. Finally, we will classify when we should expect this perverse effect to 
happen. 
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Concerning the economics of the model, the source of inefficiency is not information 
asymmetry, but no bargaining and side-payment instead. For example, teachers cannot pay 
their students to go to tutoring. “ 
1.1 Related literature 
There are two branches of literature related to the working incentive of teachers. The 
first branch is payment for input versus payment for output. Payment for input means 
rewarding teachers for the acquisition of new skills and knowledge which aim to improve 
their teaching efficiency whereas payment for output ties the teachers' salary to the student 
exam performance. However, empirical work suggests that payment for input has little 
impact on improving students' performance. For example, the Math scores of students of 
both certificated and uncertificated have similar distributions (Kane, Rockoff and Staiger, 
2008). Meanwhile, payment for output is found to be effective in rasing students' exam 
performance (Karthik and Venkatesh, 2009). As a result, increasing research interest is 
placed on the payment for output system. 
The second branch of literature studies the perverse incentives and the potential problems 
created by the payment for output method. Multitasking problem arises when teachers shift 
most of their energy from other activities which are not easily measured and incentivized in 
order to improve their students' exam result (Dixit, 2002; Holmstrom and Migrom, 1991). 
However, these neglected activities are also important to the development of their students. 
Another problem is cheating. Teachers may change test scores or assist students with ques-
tions (Goodnough, 1999; Jacob and Levitt, 2003). Disciplinary procedures are used to 
ensure that low-performing students will be absent on test day (Figlio, 2006). Finally, in-
centive payment gives rise to a distribution effect. Teachers and schools are found to focus 
on the students in the middle of the achievement distribution. Weak incentives are given to 
teachers to devote extra attention to students with high abilities and those with low abilities 
(Neal and Schanzenbach, 2010). 
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This paper points out a new perverse incentive. Teachers may become lazier when there 
is payment for output and private tutoring outside the schools. This is regarded as a more 
sophisticated way of cheating by teachers compared with changing the test scores (Jacob 
and Levitt, 2003). After all, the exam performance of students are improved even if teachers 
work less, and teachers can say that students do well because they teach well. 
We urge others to take this perverse incentive into consideration when designing an 
incentive payment for teachers. For example, pay for percentile as suggested by Barlevy 
and Neal may fail to elicit efficient efforts from teachers once scaring students into private 
tutoring becomes an option (Barlevy and Neal, 2009). Similarly, the effectiveness of teacher 
performance pay found in India (Karthik and Venkatesh, 2009) may not exist in the US where 
the tutoring industry is much larger and tutoring services are provided freely to qualified 
students. 
Private tutoring, which is also named as the shadow education system, has been studied 
extensively in Asia (Bray, 2003, 2009, 2010). However, its effect on teacher performance pay 
has never been studied before. 
When there is private tutoring, the teacher and the student can be said to be engaged in 
team production. The teacher provides his input through his effort choice and the student 
provides input through his decision rather to go to tutoring or not. Therefore the perverse 
incentive is an example of the moral hazard in teams. Monitoring by the school and richer 
measures of output may be effective in alleviating the problem (Holmstrom, 1981). 
1.2 Background 
We want to show that teachers may become lazier in order to induce students to go to 
private tutoring when there is a bonus for teachers. This warning will not be important 
unless private tutoring and pay for performance are common in the US. Therefore, in the 
following paragraphs we are going to show how prevalent they are. 
Private tutoring has been growing since the NCLB Act was signed in 2002. Current 
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estimates show that tutoring has grown into a $5 billion -$8 billion professional service 
industry (Gordon, Morgan, Ponticell and OMalley, 2004). One reason for this growth is that 
many Supplementary Educational Service (SES) providers appeared after the NCLB was 
signed. Under NCLB, Title I schools that fail to make adequate yearly progress (AYP) in 
meeting state standards for a third year must offer SES to eligible students. 
Supplemental Educational Services axe free tutoring and other supplemental academic 
enrichment services other than the instruction provided by the teachers in the day time 
school. Students from low-income families who attend Title I schools that are in their 
second year of school improvement, corrective action, or restructuring are eligible to receive 
the services. Low-income students are generally those who are eligible for free or reduced-
price lunch. 
In 2003-2004, there were 17% of the SES eligible students taking the free tutoring ser-
vices (U.S. Department of Education, 2008). SES providers were not limited to non-profit 
organizations or faith-based organizations. Indeed, 59% of the approved providers in 2003-
2004 were private providers (including non-profit and for-profit). Prom May 2003 to May 
2005, the number of state-approved Title I supplemental educational service providers in 
the nation tripled. The largest increase occurred among private providers, who accounted 
for 60 % of all state-approved providers in May 2003 and 76% in May 2005. National for-
profit companies, which served 39% of participating students, served the largest proportion 
of students serviced by private providers (U.S. Department of Education, 2008). 
Tutoring has become more popular over the past few years. This provides the first 
condition that teachers can become lazier in order to scare their students to private tutoring. 
The second condition for the teachers to have this perverse incentive is the bonus linked with 
students' exam performance. For example, 75% of the Texas Governors' Educator Excellence 
Award Grants, which was started in 2006, must be paid to full-time classroom teachers 
based on a variety of objective measures of student performance. Similarly, Florida's Special 
Teachers Are Rewarded was proposed in 2006 and the Merit Award Program replaced it in 
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2007. At least 60% of the award must be based on student performance. Table 1 in the 
appendix duplicates the table given by Podgursky and Springer (2008, pp. 7-10) that shows 
bonus schemes across the states. 
Past literature has studied the efficiency of tutoring and the problems of payment for 
output (mentioned in the related literature part) separately. We believe the linkage of these 
two topics should not be neglected when 40% of teachers in schools in which students were 
eligible for Title I SES reported talking with parents about such services. In addition, 27% 
of teachers in schools in which students were eligible fpr SES encouraged parents to apply 
for it (U.S. Department of Education, 2008). This shows that teachers'do take tutoring into 
account in their work. 
2 The model 
A few assumptions are in order. 
1. Private tutoring always helps improve a student's performance. 
2. Private tutoring usually covers content that overlaps with what regular teachers teach. 
In other words, in principle, a willing teacher would have been able to cover content 
that is covered in private tutoring. 
3. Holding constant a student's private tutoring decision, the higher the level of a teacher's 
effort, the better the student's performance. 
4. The improvement of outcome through the teacher's effort exhibits diminishing returns. 
In the current paper, the class of students is modeled as one representative student in 
order to disentangle our story from the effort distribution effect in Neal and Schanzenbach 
(2010). 
5 
X U f ， , 3 payoff) / a ( e ) 一 e ) ’ 
Nature 一e’ i ) ) 
T u t o r i n g Z \ ^ ( 1 她 1 ) ) ‘ 
- Z a(e)+w^c(e), -m 
Teacher ( T ^ r ^ < S t u d e n t (S) 
、 . . \ a(e)+wfb-c(e), 1 
\ / 
No tutoring \ /Pass(q(e.O)) 
Nature 
^^ail (l-q(e,0)) 、 
\ a(e)+w-c(e), 0 
Figure 1: Game tree of the model 
2.1 Setup 
Figure 1 shows the game tree. 
The game involves two risk-neutral players: a teacher T and a student S. S has an exam 
to take. Side-payments are prohibited.^ 
The two players play a sequential game in which T first chooses his effort level e G [0,1 
and S chooses whether to use private tutoring (I = 1) or not (I = 0). Nature then chooses 
whether S passes or fails the exam. S passes with probability 
g(e，J)=p(e) + Jt(e), (1) 
and fails with probability 1 — q{e,I), where p{e) is the passing probability solely from T's 
effort e, and t{e) is the additional passing probability if he goes to tutoring. For simplicity, 
assume p(e) + t{e) < 1. 
Assumption 1 implies t{e) > 0 for all e G [0,1], i.e., private tutoring always helps. 
Assumption 2 implies t'{e) < 0, i.e., private tutoring improves a student's performance, but 
iThis assumption is crucial. Coase theorem suggests that any inefficiency between two parties would 
be bargained away should there be no transaction cost. In the context of a teacher-student relationship, 
however, it is rather reasonable to expect that side-payments of any form is prohibited. This corresponds 
to an enormous transaction cost of bargaining, and therefore we should not expect that the most efficient 
outcome would always prevail. 
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less so if his teacher exerts more effort on him. Assumption 3 implies both p'{e) > 0 and 
p'(e) + t'{e) > 0. Assumption 4 implies / ( e ) < 0 and p"{e) + t"{e) < 0. 
We express the payoff of both players in terms of the student's payoff of passing the exam. 
Normalize the student's payoff of passing and failing the exam to 1 and 0, respectively. His 
utility from exerting effort e is a(e), and his cost of exerting effort is c(e). The notion a(e) 
summarizes all the other relevant payoffs of the teacher as a function of effort that is not 
explicitly linked to the student's exam result. For instance, exerting more effort may increase 
his chance of promotion, lower the probability of being fired, prevent complaints from the 
student's parents, etc. Assume an interior solution.^ 
It is usually difficult to monitor precisely and objectively the teacher's effort. Although 
possible in principle, it is almost politically impossible or too radical in practice to link 
teachers' pay to whether their students use private tutoring. To incorporate these two 
features in the model, consider the school designs a compensation package for the teacher 
with a constraint: only 5"s exam outcome is contractible but not T's effort (e) or whether 
S uses private tutoring (/). The school therefore sets T's compensation package such that 
if S passes the exam, T gets w -\-h] otherwise, T gets w. With either pass or fail, b > 0 
corresponds to a performance pay and 6 = 0 no performance pay. 
Their expected payoffs are then functions of e and I. T's expected payoff is 
a[e) +W + b\p{e) + It(e)] - c(e), (2) 
and S"s expected payoff is 
p{e) + It{e)] - Im, (3) 
where m is the price of using private tutoring. 
2This means we assume (a) both a(e) and c(e) are continuously differentiable and strictly increasing, 
(b) a(e) is concave (a'(e) > 0, a〃(e) < 0), (c) c(e) is convex (c(e) > 0’ c'(e) > 0 and c〃(e) > 0), and (d) 
c(0) < a(0) and c(l) > a(l). 
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2.2 The rationale for performance pay 
Without bonus {b = 0) and private tutoring (/ = 0), T gets a payoff of a{e) + w- c(e) while 
S gets p(e). Socially optimality requires the level of effort e*, such that its social marginal 
benefit equals its social marginal cost, i.e., 
a'(e*)+y(e*) = c'(e*). (4) 
Without bonus, however, T does not internalize the performance of S. Instead, T chooses 
an effort level e that equates his own private marginal benefit and marginal cost of effort, 
i.e., 
a\e) = c'(e). (5) 
Since p'[e) > 0 by assumption 3, the teacher's effort is too low (e < e*). 
The rationale of performance pay is to induce teachers to internalize their students' 
performance. Within this model, suppose a bonus 6 > 0 is introduced. Without private 
tutoring, the teacher then chooses an effort level e to maximize the expected payoff a(e) + 
b[p(e)] — c(e) + w, such that 
.a'(e)-\-bp'{e) = c'{e). ( 6 ) 
With any positive bonus smaller than 1, e < e < e*, i.e., the bonus induces the teacher to 
work closer to the socially optimal level of effort. If the bonus is set at 6 = 1, then e = e*.^  
Performance pay is therefore effective without private tutoring; it elicits a higher level of 
effort from the teacher. 
2.3 Performance pay with private tutoring 
The interaction between the student and the teacher becomes strategic once private tutoring 
is possible. In expecting that the student would respond to his lack of effort by using private 
3 Note that the fixed payment w is a transfer between the teacher and the school which does not change 
the level of effort. 
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tutoring, the teacher may, in response to a bonus, lower his effort level strategically as long 
as it also induces the student to use the private tutoring. This section states the precise 
condition for such a strategic move. 
Given a level of effort e, S gets \p{e) + t{e)] - m if he uses private tutoring, and p{e) if 
not. Therefore, S will choose to go if and only if t{e) > m, i.e., the benefit is at least as high 
as the cost. 5"s strategy is therefore 
1 if tie) > m, 
r ( e 叫 • (7) 
0 if otherwise. ‘ 
\ 
Define e such that t{e) = m. This definition will be handy because the student only uses 
private tutoring if the teacher exerts a level lower than or equal to this threshold e. 
Expecting S"s strategy, T's problem is 
maxa(e) + w + b\p{e) + r{e)t(e)] - c(e). (8) 
e 
Denote the solution to this problem as e气 The derivation is in Appendix 5.2. Here we state 
the following proposition: 
Proposition 1. Having performance pay (b> 0) elicits a lower effort from the teacher than 
that without performance pay (b = 0) if and only if (a) e < e and (b) t{e) > f^ a'(x) + 
bp'{x) — c'{x)dx/b. ‘ 
(a) e < e means originally the student is not going to tutoring. 
After bonus is introduced, the teacher actually compares two expected payoffs: one is 
the expected payoff obtained by working harder on his own, and the other is obtained by 
working at the threshold e, which is just small enough to scare the student to go to tutoring. 
(b) means that the expected payoff of choosing e is greater. 
A numerical example in Appendix 5.3 illustrates such a possibility. 
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Note 2: Without tutoring, teacher may work harder when there is bonus. 
However, they may work less when there is tutoring. 
Figure 2: Work less, go tutoring 
Figure 2 illustrates the intuition. 
In Figure 2, the teacher was working at effort level e without bonus. After bonus is 
introduced, he compares the expected payoff at B and the expected payoff at A. The expected 
payoff at A is obtained by working at the threshold e to scare the student into going to 
tutoring. If this is higher than that at B, he will choose the lower effort level e. 
2.4 Effect of increasing the bonus 
The magnitude of the bonus affects the decision of the teacher. Let u{b) denote the teacher's 
payoff if the incentive is b and the teacher chooses e{b). Let denote the teacher's 
payoff if the incentive is b and the teacher chooses e. The derivative of u{b) — u{b) is 
p{e{b)) — {p{e) + t{e)). This derivative is increasing in b. Therefore there are three possible 
cases: (1) u{b) — u(b) < 0 for all bin this case, the optimal e is always e. (2) u{b) — u{b) > 0 
for all b. In this case, the optimal e is always e. (3) u{b) — u{b) < 0 for all b less than some 
10 
critical value b. In this case, increasing b from 0 to the value less than b will lower the effort 
of the teacher (from e to e), but increasing b from > 6 to 62 > 61 will raise the effort (from 
e(bi) to 6(62). . 
2.5 Good teacher is not less susceptible 
Condition (a) of Proposition 1 implies the following corollary: 
Corollary 2. Only those teachers whose students are not going to tutoring originally may 
lower their effort when bonus is introduced. For those teachers whose, students are going to 
tutoring originally, they must work harder when there is bonus. 
Those who are bad in teaching may be regarded as more likely to work lazier. This is only 
true in the case that their students are originally not going to tutoring. Consider a school 
with two teachers whose cost functions are parameterized by kc{e) with different values of 
k. When k decreases, the difference between the payoff of working harder and the payoff of 
working less {u{h) — u(b)) increases. Therefore a good teacher (with a small k) is more likely 
to choose the solution e{b) rather than the soultion e. 
However, one cannot conclude that the good teacher is less susceptible when we consider 
who is more likely to meet the condition (a) of Proposition 1. a'{e) = kc!{e) means e 
increases when k decreases. Therefore, it is easier for the good teacher (with a small k) to 
meet condition (a) e < e in Proposition 1. For the bad teacher whose student is originally 
going to private tutoring, scaring the student to tutoring is no longer an option. 
Table 3 is a table showing different cases when the perverse incentive may be found. 
In case 1, the student of the good teacher and the student of the bad teacher are going 
to tutoring before bonus is introduced. There will be no perverse incentive after bonus is 
introduced. In cases 2aand 2b, only the student of bad teacher is going to tutoring before 
bonus is introduced. No perverse incentive will be found on the bad teacher when there 
is bonus. In cases 3a, 3b, 3c, the student of the good teacher and the student of the bad 
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B: Bad teacher's Before bonus is After bonus is Is perverse 
stodenl introduced. introduced, incentive found? 
G: Good teacher's 
studenl 
T: Smdeiit is going 
to tutoring 
NT: Not T 
Case ! B: T B: T No 
G:T G:T NQ 
Case 2a B: T B: T No 
G: NT G: NT No 
Case 2b B: T B: T No 
G: NT G: T 
Case 3a B: NT B: NT No 
G： NT G:NT m 
Case 3b B: NT B: T Yes 
G: NT G: NT No 
Case 3c B:NT B: T Yes 
G: NT G:T ^ 
Table 3 : Different cases when the perverse incentive is found 
teacher are not going to tutoring originally, and perverse incentive may be found when bonus 
is introduced. 
2.6 Effect of the decreasing tutoring fee 
Does Proposition 1 matter? We believe it matters given the current development of SES in 
the US. The fact that more and more tutorial schools axe operating means that students can 
travel less to go to tutoring. In addition, if the tutoring industry enjoys economies of scale, 
teachers may be more willing to lower their effort as explained in the following proposition. 
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The derivation is in Appendix 5.4. 
Proposition 3. If the student is not going to tutoring when there is no bonus, then the 
teacher's expected payoff if the teacher chooses a lower effort (working at the threshold level 
e )will be higher when the tutoring fee decreases, and the expected payoff at e remains un-
changed. Therefore, he is more likely to choose a lower effort level when the tutoring fee 
decreases. 
The intuition is that when private tutoring fee is high, the student will not go to it unless 
it is very worthwhile to do so, that is, t(e) > m. Assumption 2 implies tf (e) < 0. Therefore, 
the teacher has to lower his effort level considerably to induce the student to go to tutoring 
if m is large. The level is so low that the student's performance is badly affected, and it may 
be better for the teacher to work hard and rely on his own to raise the student's performance. 
In other words, the teacher is comparing the p{e) + t(e) at a very low value e with the p{e) 
at a high value e. If m is very large, e has to be low such that t{e) > m for the student to 
go to tutoring, this low e greatly lowers p(e). Now, when tutoring fee decreases, the teacher 
can just lower his effort slightly to induce the student to go to tutoring. 
Figure 4 illustrates this proposition. 
In Figure 4, the teacher was originally comparing the expected payoff at point A and that 
at point B before the tutoring fee decreases. After the tutoring fee decreases, the teacher 
compares the expected payoff at point A and that at point C. He will choose a lower effort 
level if the expected payoff at point C is higher. 
A numerical example is given in Appendix 5.5. 
A summary of the proposed model is illustrated in Figure 5. 
3 Conclusion 
This paper illustrates the possibilities of a new perverse incentive when performance pay to . 
teacher is introduced. A few propositions are stated. 
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Note 3: When tutoring fee decreases fromml to m2，t (ml) increases to t(m2). 
p(e) + t(e) increases, rising teacher's incentive to scare the student to private tutoring 
by lower effort. 
Figure 3: Teacher may work less when tutoring fee decreases 
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Figure 4: Summary of the model 
Proposition 1 shows that teachers may choose a lower effort to induce students to go to 
private tutoring when bonus is introduced. The NCLB Act aims to increase teachers' and 
schools' accountability. One of the ways to do this is to use bonus. At the same time, the 
private tutoring industry is growing in the U.S. Therefore, the NCLB Act may be one of the 
reasons the industry has been growing recently, and we are not ruling out other causes. 
Corollary 2 contradicts the intuition that only the less efficient teachers may cheat; it 
shows that the more efficient teachers are also prone to choosing a lower effort level. Re-
sources are misallocated if bonus is introduced to these more efficient teachers. 
Proposition 3 shows that a teacher may lower his effort to induce his students to go to 
tutoring when private tutoring fee decreases. If the tutoring industry has economies of scale, 
then the tutoring fee may further decrease after the students are induced to go to tutoring. 
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5 Appendix 
5.1 Tables showing bonus schemes across states 
5.2 Derivation for Proposition 1 
It helps to break down this problem into two sub-problems. 
First, T maximizes his expected payoff a[e) -{-w + b[p{e)] — c(e) subject to the constraint 
that e > e, i.e., 
maxa(e) -\-w + b\p(e)] — c(e). (9) 
. e>e 
Without the constraint, this maximization problem is the same as that when performance 
pay is introduced and there is no private tutoring. The unconstrained solution is given by e 
in (6). Therefore, the constrained solution is e if e > e, and no solution exists if e < e.^  
Second, T maximizes his expected payoff a(e) -\-w + b\p{e) + t{e)] — c(e) subject to the 
constraint that e < e, i.e., . 
maxa(e) + it； + b\p{e) + t{e)] - c(e). (10) 
The unconstrained solution, denoted as e, is to equate T's own private marginal benefit 
to marginal cost, i.e, 
a\e)-\-b\p'{e) + t'(e)]=c\e). ( 1 1 ) 
Since p'{e) + t'{e) > 0 by assumption 3, therefore e > e. The constrained solution is given 
4This is a technical point when we assume that if e = e, the student always go to tutorial. This tie-
breaking rule makes the solution empty. It does not, however, result in any inconsistency in the argument 
because if e is chosen by T, the student always use private tutoring and the teacher's expected payoff is 













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































by e if e < e, and e if e > e. 
If e < e , then e > e. Then T compares the payoff at e and at e. He will choose e instead 
of e iff the payoff at e is greater than or equal to that at e, i.e., a{e)-{-w-\-b[p{e)-}-t{e)] — c{e) > 
a(e) + + 6[p(e)] — c(e), which is equivalent to t(e) > f^ a'(x) + bp'(x) — c'(x)dx/b. 
5.3 Numerical example for Proposition 1, the case teacher works 
less when bonus is introduced ‘ 
Let a(e) = 34.8837x/e + 0.85 ’ c(e) = 58.1395e2, p{e)=《e、t(e) = — 6 = 1， 
r ^ m ) = 0.1. 
no bonus, a'(e) = c'(e), e = 0.15. 
With bonus, for the range = 0.1 < e < 1, the student will not go to private 
tutoring and teacher chooses e to maximize a(e) + 6(p(e)) — c(e) -\-w, e = 0.1600. For the 
range 0 < e < 0.1 = the student will go to private tutoring and the teacher will 
choose the effort level e = 0.1, so he will compare the payoff at e = 0.1 and e = 0.16. 
a(O.l) + 6[p(0.1) + 力(0.1)] - c(O.l) = 34.1606. 
a(0.16) + %(0.16)] - c(0.16) = 33.9693. 
Therefore, the teacher will work less when there is bonus. 
5.4 Derivation for Proposition 3. 
Teacher's expected payoff at the threshold e is a{e) + b\p{e) + t{e)] +w- c(e). The first 
derivative a'{e) + b\p\e) + "(e)] - "(e) > 0 for e < 咨 if the student is not going to tutoring 
when there is no bonus. This is because a'(e) - c!{e) > 0 for e < e and p'{e) + t'{e) > 0 
by assumption 3. By assumption 4, t'{e) < 0. Therefore, when tutoring fee m decreases, e 
increases and a(e) + b\p{e) + t{e)] -\-w- c{e) increases. 
23 
5.5 Numerical example for Proposition 3, the case teacher works 
less when tutoring fee decreases. 
Let a{e) = 34.8837^6 + 0.85 , c(e) = 58.1395e2, p(e) = yfe, t{e) = - b = 1, 
mi = 0.5, then r^ (mi ) = 0.0505. 
Without bonus, a'(e) 二 c'(e), e = 0.15. 
With bonus, for the range t~^(m) = 0.0505 < e < 1, the student will not go to private 
tutoring and the teacher chooses e to maximize a(e) + b\p{e)] — c(e) + w;, e = 0.16. For the 
range 0 < e < 0.0505 = the student will go to private tutoring and the teacher will 
choose the lower effort level e = 0.0505, so he will compare the payoff at e = 0.0505 and 
e = 0.16. 
a(0.0505) + 6[p(0.0505) + 力(0.0505)] - c(0.0505) = 33.6792. 
a(0.16) + 6[p(0.16)] — c(0.16) = 33.9693. 
Therefore the teacher will choose e= 0.16 and work more when there is bonus. Now, suppose 
the tutoring fee is lowered from 0.5 to 0.4254, then 亡一i(m2) = 0.1. The analysis is the same 
as in Proposition 1. The teacher will choose e =0.1 and work less. 
24 
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